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“No Man Is Above the Law and No Man Is Below It:” How Qualified Immunity Reform 
Could Create Accountability and Curb Widespread Police Misconduct 
 
Lindsey de Stefan* 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 In recent months, it has been impossible to ignore the overwhelming presence of police 
violence in the media.1  Hardly a month has gone by without headlines asserting use of excessive 
force, brutality, or other misconduct in some corner of the United States.2  It seems that no region 
of the nation has been unaffected by the violence, with civilian deaths at the hands of law 
enforcement cropping up from San Francisco3 to New York City4 to South Carolina,5 and almost 
everywhere in between.  And with public confidence in law enforcement at a twenty-two year 
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Ramapo College of New Jersey.  Special thanks 
to Professor Alice Ristroph and Katheryn Pereyra-Caldwell for their support and guidance throughout the writing 
process. 
1 Commentary and criticism about American police has spanned various forms of media and traversed many genres.  
See, e.g., The Daily Show with Jon Stewart (Comedy Central television broadcast Dec. 3, 2014) (discussing the grand 
jury's decision not to indict the officer who killed Eric Gardner, explaining:  "I think what is so utterly depressing is 
that none of the ambiguities that existed in the Ferguson case exist in the Staten Island Case, and yet the outcome is 
exactly the same: No crime, no trial. All harm, no foul.”). 
2 See, e.g., Unarmed Black Mo. Teen Shot After Altercation, Police Say, CBS NEWS (Aug. 10, 2014, 1:30 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/michael-brown-shooting-unarmed-black-missouri-teen-shot-after-altercation-police-
say/; Josh Sanburn, Behind the Video of Eric Garner's Deadly Confrontation with New York Police, TIME (July 23, 
2014), http://time.com/3016326/eric-garner-video-police-chokehold-death/. 
3 See Timothy Williams, San Francisco Police Officers to Be Dismissed over Racist Texts, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/04/us/san-francisco-police-officers-to-be-dismissed-over-racist-texts.html?_r=0. 
4 See Christopher Mathias, Video Shows NYPD Officers Beating Brooklyn Man after He Appears to Surrender, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 23, 2015, 4:08 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/nypd-beating-thomas-
jennings_55b0ff8fe4b07af29d57a1c0. 
5 Michael S. Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, South Carolina Officer is Charged with the Murder of Walter Scott, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/us/south-carolina-officer-is-charged-with-murder-in-black-
mans-death.html?_r=0. 
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low—with only 52 percent of U.S. citizens asserting that they have considerable confidence in law 
enforcement6—the nation has clearly taken notice.7 
 Naturally, these violent incidents raise important questions for many Americans, regardless 
of locale or the type of community in which they reside.  Why is this happening?  And how can 
we stop it?  Unsurprisingly, extensive media commentary has ultimately invited a myriad of 
proposed answers to these inquiries and has even generated some potential solutions.  Some point 
to a lack of education and opine that officers need more comprehensive training to teach them how 
to "defuse the sorts of deadly racially charged confrontations" that have recently been highlighted 
in numerous communities throughout the country.8  Others suggest that allowing citizens to record 
police would create officer accountability, serve as a disciplinary basis for abusive behavior, 
encourage the use of justified policing tactics, and generally deter misconduct.9  Others still 
suggest that police culture is to blame since rookies shape their attitudes about the use of force 
based on the words and actions of fellow officers,10 and because the warrior mentality of policing 
fosters an “us” versus “them” relationship between law enforcement and citizens.11  In fact, a few 
                                                 
6 Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., Confidence in Police Lowest in 22 Years, GALLUP (June 19, 2015), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/183704/confidence-police-lowest-years.aspx (explaining that 25 percent of American 
have a "great deal of confidence" in police, 30 percent have "some confidence," 27 percent have "quite a lot" of 
confidence, and an all-time high of 18 percent have either very little or no confidence in police).  
7 The international community has also reacted to U.S. police brutality.  See, e.g., Adam Taylor, How the Rest of the 
World Reacted to the Ferguson Verdict, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/11/25/how-the-rest-of-the-world-reacted-to-the-
ferguson-verdict/ ("'So the U.S. government, when talking about their own country, forgets about democracy, human 
rights, protection of "peaceful protesters" and people's right to protest,' Russian news outlet Pravda.ru proclaimed . . . 
."). 
8 Phillip Swarts, Police Need Better Training and Community Relations, Presidential Task Force is Told, WASH. 
TIMES (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jan/13/police-brutality-solutions-are-training-
community-/?page=all. 
9 Carol M. Bast, Tipping the Scales in Favor of Civilian Taping of Encounters with Police Officers, 5 U. DENV. CRIM. 
L. REV. 61, 97 (2015). 
10 David Lester, Officer Attitudes Toward Police Use of Force, in AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: UNDERSTANDING AND 
CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE 177, 182–83 (William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1995). 
11 Sue Rahr & Stephen K. Rice, From Warriors to Guardians: Recommitting American Police Culture to Democratic 
Ideals, NEW PERSPECTIVES IN POLICING (U.S. Dep’t of Justice/Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Wash., D.C.), Apr. 2015, at 4. 
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experts have even suggested that there has not been a wave of police violence, but that mainstream 
media is merely covering brutality more frequently and comprehensively.12 
Irrespective of whether there has been an increase in the incidence of brutality or whether 
the nation is merely recognizing what has been an ongoing reality for many U.S. citizens, the 
existence of a problem is now inescapably obvious.  The solution, however, is decidedly less clear.  
Perhaps none of the aforementioned proposals are the right answer.  Alternatively, and more likely, 
maybe they are all the answer—at least partially and in combination with a number of other 
considerations.  It is improbable that a single factor can be deemed the sole cause of widespread 
police misconduct.  Of course, an elaborate problem with multiple dimensions will require an 
equally multifaceted solution.  In fact, any adequate resolution will likely require the cooperation 
of many individuals and entities across various disciplines and industries.13  But no matter how 
winding, every path to change must begin with a single step.  And the most logical place to begin 
is by reforming the stringent protection from civil liability enjoyed by law enforcement officers 
alleged to have violated individual constitutional rights. 
 This Comment will explore how judicial amendment of the qualified immunity doctrine—
specifically as it is applied to law enforcement officers—could serve as a catalyst to begin to rein 
in police misconduct.  Part II will describe the general history of the most significant statutory 
provision in this context, Section 1983, and the expansion of constitutional torts that occurred in 
the mid-twentieth century.  Part III focuses on the judicial development of qualified immunity in 
the Supreme Court and explains the status of the doctrine today.  Part IV discusses some of the 
                                                 
12 See Eliott C. McLaughlin, We're Not Seeing More Police Shootings, Just More News Coverage, CNN (Apr. 21, 
2015, 7:26 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/20/us/police-brutality-video-social-media-attitudes/ (discussing the 
lack of accurate statistics regarding police killing civilians in the line of duty or police use of excessive force). 
13 For example, implementing more comprehensive training would take the combined efforts of experts in police 
brutality to design such training, as well as the cooperation of police forces nationwide.  Statutes protecting those who 
audiotape police would require the actions of Congress or State legislatures—or both.  And a change in police culture 
would necessitate the active participation of police unions and local law enforcement nationwide. 
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most significant practical problems with the modern qualified immunity jurisprudence and its 
application.  Part V goes on to analyze the recent spotlight on police use of force.  Finally, Part VI 
proposes that judicial amendment of qualified immunity application will serve as an effective first 
step in decreasing the overall incidence of police misconduct in the United States. 
 
II. The Court’s Expansion of Remedies for Violations of Constitutional Rights 
 In order to appreciate the qualified immunity doctrine and its modern implications, one 
must first journey briefly down the historical path that preceded its inception.  That path begins 
with Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code, which provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to 
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought 
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial 
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was 
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.14 
 Although the statute now finds its home in the United States Code, it was originally enacted 
as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and was colloquially referred to as the “Ku Klux Klan Act” 
at that time.15  In the post-Civil War Reconstruction years, radical Republican Congressmen were 
becoming ever more worried that murders, whippings, and other (mostly) Klan-perpetrated 
brutality in some southern states were preventing newly-freed slaves from voting.16  These fears 
                                                 
14 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (LexisNexis 2015). 
15 Ian D. Forsythe, A Guide to Civil Rights Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: An Overview of Supreme Court and 
Eleventh Circuit Precedent, THE CONSTITUTION SOC’Y (1998), http://www.constitution.org/brief/forsythe_42-
1983.htm.  
16 David Achtenberg, A "Milder Measure of Villainy:" The Unknown History of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Meaning of 
"Under Color of Law," 1999 UTAH L. REV. 1, 7 (1999). 
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were affirmed when the 1870 elections brought a wave of violence.17  After most affected State 
governments failed both to punish the perpetrators of those atrocities and to protect the victims, 
Congress intervened by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which included what we now know 
as § 1983.18  In the subsequent ninety years, § 1983 was largely inconsequential;19  but in 1961, 
when the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Monroe v. Pape, the statute 
began a rapid ascent to a position of significance in constitutional and civil rights jurisprudence.20 
 In Monroe, the Court held that § 1983 provided a remedy to individuals “deprived of 
constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities” as a result of a government official’s abuse of his 
position.21  In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on its earlier statutory construction of the 
phrase “under color of” as including acts of an official that are in violation of state law.22  The 
Court also reviewed the legislative history of the original Civil Rights Act in considerable detail 
and determined that one of Congress’s primary purposes was to provide a federal remedy for 
infringements of constitutional rights in circumstances in which a state remedy was theoretically, 
but not practically, available.23  In so concluding, the Court vastly expanded the understanding 
of—and, thus, the potential application of—§ 1983 as a tool in civil rights litigation.24  Indeed, 
                                                 
17 Id. 
18 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174–76 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 
(1978). 
19 See Brentley Smith, Section 1983 and Horizontal Inequities: Addressing the Disparate Application of the Supreme 
Court's Section 1983 Preclusion Jurisprudence to Similarly Situated Litigants, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 279 
(2014) (explaining that between 1871 and 1961, only twenty-one cases were brought under § 1983 in federal courts—
only nine of which made it to the Supreme Court). 
20 See Forsythe, supra note 15. 
21 365 U.S. at 172. 
22 See Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 99 (1951); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1944) (“It is clear 
that under ‘color’ of law means under ‘pretense’ of law.”); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) (“Misuse 
of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority 
of state law, is action taken ‘under color of’ state law.”).  
23 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174–75 (describing the “lawless conditions” of the South and the failure of those states to 
provide any “effective redress”). 
24 See Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights—Will the Statute Remain Alive 
or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 19 (1985) (explaining that in the twenty-two years before Monroe, the number 
of § 1983 claims to reach the Court “can almost be counted on one hand”); David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity 
Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 
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after Monroe, the number of cases brought under the statute skyrocketed,25 and § 1983 has since 
become the so-called “statute of choice” under which to bring constitutional tort lawsuits against 
government officials.26  But Monroe was not the Court’s last word on available redress for 
constitutional violations—rather, it was just the beginning of a long and tumultuous relationship. 
 A decade later, the Court created a new cause of action that is, in effect, the federal analog 
of a § 1983 claim—the Bivens action.27  In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics, the Court concluded that there is a private right of action for violations of 
federal rights perpetrated by federal (rather than state) officials.28  While Bivens did not directly 
implicate § 1983 or litigation thereunder,29 Bivens did further expand the availability of private 
remedies for constitutional torts.  Then, seventeen years after Monroe, the Court expanded the 
ambit of § 1983 even further.30  After undertaking a second (and equally exhaustive) review of the 
legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 in Monell v. Department of Social Services, the 
Court overruled a portion of its Monroe holding by concluding that municipal bodies could be 
subject to liability under § 1983.31  However, the Court provided a substantial shield to municipal 
                                                 
28 (1989) (opining that “the Court freed the [Civil Rights] Act from a narrow and unjustified construction”); Michael 
Wells, The Past and the Future of Constitutional Torts: From Statutory Interpretation to Common Law Rules, 19 
CONN. L. REV. 53, 53 (1986) (asserting that “the Supreme Court revived a long-neglected, ninety-year-old statute . . . 
making it a broad cause of action to remedy constitutional violations”); Eric H. Zagrans, “Under Color of” What Law: 
A Reconstructed Model of Section 1983 Liability, 71 VA. L. REV. 499, 500–01 (1985) (averring that the Court 
“breathed new life into the moribund [Civil Rights Act]”); id. at 500 n.2 (explaining that between 1871 and 1920, 
federal courts decided only twenty-one actions brought § 1983—only nine of which reached the Supreme Court). 
25 See Aldisert J. Ruggero, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge’s Thoughts on Section 1983, 
Comity and the Federal Caseload, 557 LAW & SOC. ORDER 557, 563 (1973) (describing the 1100 percent increase in 
cases brought under § 1983 in the decade after Monroe); History of the Federal Judiciary, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/jurisdiction_federal_question.html (“Civil rights cases, particularly suits 
filed under Section 1983, became one of the largest sources of federal court business in the late twentieth century.”).  
26 Rudovsky, supra note 24, at 25. 
27 John D. Kirby, Qualified Immunity for Civil Rights Violations: Refining the Standard, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 461, 
464, 466 (1990). 
28 403 U.S. 390, 392 (1971). 
29 See Kirby, supra note 27, at 466–67 (explaining that § 1983 does not provide a private right of action for violations 
of constitutional rights by federal officials). 
30 See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978). 
31 See id. at 690. 
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bodies by holding that a municipality could incur civil liability only when it was itself the cause of 
the constitutional violation alleged, rather than imposing liability vicariously based solely on its 
employment of the tortfeasor.32  Put differently, the Monell Court concluded that a municipal body 
may be subject to liability when “the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or 
executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated 
by that body's officers.”33  But the Court left the door for any further municipal exemptions from 
liability wide open: “[W]e express no views on the scope of any municipal immunity beyond 
holding that municipal bodies sued under § 1983 cannot be entitled to an absolute immunity, lest 
our decision that such bodies are subject to suit under § 1983 ‘be drained of meaning.’”34  
 Noticeably, none of these early cases directly grappled with the qualified immunity 
doctrine,35 and one might naturally wonder how they amount to significant steps on the path to its 
conception.  Indeed, the aggregate effect of these decisions appears to be a pivotal expansion in 
the development of constitutional rights by allowing individuals greater opportunity to seek redress 
when government officials violate their constitutional or statutory rights.  However, in the wake 
of these cases, the Court began to face the practical considerations of increased liability for 
government officials: its disallowance of vicarious municipal liability meant that, in most cases, 
the only potential defendant—and thus the only party who might shoulder the burden of damages 
to the plaintiff—would be the official who had inflicted the constitutional injury.36  
 
                                                 
32 Id. at 692–94 (emphasis added) (“[I]t is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its 
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the 
government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”). 
33 Id. at 692. 
34 Id. at 701. 
35 Save, of course, for Monell’s express declination to decide questions of immunity. 
36 See Kirby, supra note 27, at 467 & n.42. 
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III. The Development of Qualified Immunity 
 The qualified immunity doctrine has diverged substantially from the general course toward 
expanding constitutional rights that Monroe and its progeny began to pave in the 1960s and 1970s.  
It has instead veered off down a long and winding byway that continues until this day.  In fact, it 
would sometimes seem that the two paths now travel in opposite directions altogether.  Notably, 
the statutory text of § 1983 does not explicitly or impliedly provide for any immunities;37 but as 
the Court gradually increased liability for public officials who had violated constitutional rights, it 
correspondingly started to extend the immunities that had traditionally been available at common 
law.38  Interestingly, the Court conceded that the statute’s text is broader than the common law of 
torts was in 1871 because it “purports to create a damages remedy against every state official for 
the violation of any person’s federal constitutional or statutory rights.”39  In order to deal with the 
lack of legal and historical context to fit the field of constitutional torts, the Court has come to rely 
on loosely related common law causes of action and their corresponding immunities40 in an attempt 
to tailor them to the structure of modern government.41  In so doing, the Court has gradually, but 
consistently, expanded the scope of immunities available, both in terms of which officials are 
entitled to such immunity42 and in regard to the types of situations in which immunity is 
                                                 
37 See supra text accompanying note 14. 
38 See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123 (1997) ("We have [] recognized that Congress intended [§ 1983] to be 
construed in light of common law principles that were well settled at the time of its enactment.”); Pierson v. Ray, 386 
U.S. 547, 557 (1967) (expanding the common law defense of good faith and probable cause that was available for 
false arrest and imprisonment to actions brought under § 1983). 
39 Kalina, 522 U.S. at 123. 
40 See Kirby, supra note 27, at 468 (discussing the Court’s extension of absolute immunity to constitutional tort claims 
based on concerns about public policy and “a combination of loosely analogous common law immunities”); Rudovsky, 
supra note 24, at 36 (explaining that a threshold question of the qualified immunity analysis is “whether and to what 
degree qualified immunity would have been a defense in common law analogues to constitutional tort claims”). 
41 See Jack M. Beermann, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Avoidance, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 139, 145 (2009) 
(noting the Court-created doctrine used to adapt the scope of immunities at common law to contemporary government 
structure). 
42 See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807–13 (1982) (qualified immunity for high-level Presidential aides); 
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975) (qualified immunity for school officials); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 
232, 237–38 (1974) (qualified immunity for Governor of Ohio). 
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available.43  The Court has arguably enlarged the immunities available to the officials perpetrating 
constitutional violations more than it expanded the remedies for those whose rights were violated 
in the first instance. 
Interestingly, the Court began sketching the contours of official immunity under § 1983 a 
decade before it broadened the applicability of that statute in Monroe, concluding “that § 1983 
[was] to be read in harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in 
derogation of them.”44  Accordingly, in Tenney v. Bradhove the Court noted a legacy of legislative 
freedom dating back to sixteenth century England and held that legislators were entitled to absolute 
immunity from civil liability when acting within the legislative capacity.45  The Court later 
reinforced a similarly longstanding tradition of absolute judicial immunity46 and the well-settled 
common law rule of absolute immunity for prosecutors.47 
Even before its admittedly limited imposition of municipal liability in Monell, the Court 
had already begun to rein in the breadth of the newly-expanded § 1983 remedy.48  In Pierson v. 
Ray, the Court faced the issue of what immunity, if any, was available to police officers who 
arrested a group of clergymen for violating a Mississippi law when, several years after the arrest, 
                                                 
43 See generally City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774–78 (2015)  (reversing Court of 
Appeals and granting qualified immunity to officers who forcibly entered the room of a mentally disabled woman and 
shot her multiple times); Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 349–50 (2014) (per curiam) (reversing Court of Appeals 
and granting qualified immunity to officer who went into a private backyard and onto the deck without a warrant); 
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2020–24 (2014) (reversing District Court and Court of Appeals and granting 
qualified immunity to officers who fired fifteen shots to end a high-speed car chase and killed the driver and 
passenger); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 374–86 (2007) (reversing District Court and Court of Appeals and granting 
qualified immunity to officer who ended a car chase by running the driver off the road and rendering him a 
quadriplegic). 
44 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976) (summarizing the holding of Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 
367 (1951)).  
45 See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376–79 (expressing disbelief at the notion “that Congress—itself a staunch advocate of 
legislative freedom—would impinge on a tradition so well grounded in history and reason by covert inclusion in the 
general language [of § 1983]”). 
46 See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 553–55 (comparing legislative and judicial immunity at common law, explaining that “[t]he 
immunity of judges for acts within the judicial role is equally well established, and we presume that Congress would 
have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine”). 
47 See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 421–27. 
48 See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555–57. 
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the law was held unconstitutional as applied to circumstances similar to those at issue.49  In holding 
that officers were immune from civil liability if they acted in good faith and with probable cause, 
the Court placed a particular emphasis on fairness, reasoning that a police officer should not have 
to “choose between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he has 
probable cause, and being mulcted in damages if he does.”50  In recognizing that public officials 
not otherwise entitled to absolute immunity51 also require some margin for error,52 Pierson’s “good 
faith and probable cause” guideline53 was the birth of an immunity doctrine that would continue 
to plague the Supreme Court,54 to baffle lower federal courts,55 and to consume considerable 
judicial resources56 in the ensuing decades. 
Seven years later, the Court undertook its first qualified immunity analysis after its initial 
introduction in Pierson.57  In Scheuer v. Rhodes, the Court clarified the application of the doctrine, 
explaining that there were two criteria that must be met for an official to be eligible for immunity: 
                                                 
49 Id. at 549–50. 
50 See id. at 555–57. 
51 See id. at 555 (noting that “[t]he common law has never granted police officers an absolute and unqualified 
immunity”). 
52 See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 242 (“Implicit in the idea that officials have some immunity—absolute or qualified—for 
their acts, is a recognition that they may err.”). 
53 Id. at 245. 
54 See generally Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 223 (2009); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 194 (2001); Harlow, 
457 U.S. at 800. 
55 See, e.g., Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 208–09 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting the Circuit split regarding whether judges 
or juries should decide if qualified immunity applies); Harbert Int’l v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1285–86 (1998) 
(disagreeing with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ interpretations of Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984)); DiMeglio v. 
Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 795–97 (4th Cir. 1995) (surveying the interpretations of eight different Courts of Appeal to 
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991) and asserting disagreement with all of those constructions of the Court’s 
holding).  
56 See Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role of Facts in Constitutional 
Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1997) (noting that federal courts have used increasingly more resources to 
adjudicating immunity claims in recent years); Charles T. Putnam & Charles T. Ferris, Defending a Maligned Defense: 
The Policy Bases of the Qualified Immunity Defense in Actions Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 12 BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 665, 
670 (1992) (describing the scarcity of judicial resources but the ever-increasing number of § 1983 cases filed in 
“overburdened federal courts”).  See also Table C-3: U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, by Nature of 
Suit and District, During the 12-Month Period Ending March 31, 2015, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-3/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics/2015/03/31 (follow “Download Data 
Table” hyperlink) (Excluding prisoner petitions, 36,841 of the 281,608 civil cases (approximately 13 percent) filed in 
District Courts from April 1, 2014, to March 31, 2015, were described as “Civil Rights” cases.).  
57 See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 232. 
12 
(1) he must have had reasonable grounds for the belief formed in light of all circumstances at the 
time; and (2) he must have had a good faith belief that the action was lawful.58  Put another way, 
the Court engaged in a two-pronged analysis that assessed the official’s allegedly unconstitutional 
act under both objective and subjective standards.59  The Court further elucidated this two-part test 
shortly thereafter, explaining that entitlement to immunity requires that an official act with a 
sincere belief that he is doing right, and he must not have violated a well-settled constitutional 
right—even if the violation resulted from ignorance or indifference.60 
These early cases justified qualified immunity on two primary bases, both of which were 
rooted in the rationales of traditional common law: fairness and overdeterrence.61  The Court 
explained that public officials, from police officers to governors, “who fail to make decisions when 
they are needed or who do not act to implement decisions when they are made do not fully and 
faithfully perform the duties of their offices.”62  The Court further expounded that the immunity 
doctrine recognizes that officials will sometimes make mistakes and, accordingly, gives them room 
to err in the performance of their duties based on the assumption “it is better to risk some error and 
possible injury from such error than [for an official] not to decide or act at all.”63  The Court’s 
justification demonstrates its concern that officials would fail to make important decisions or take 
necessary actions for fear of incurring civil liability, and that the public good would ultimately 
                                                 
58 See id. at 247–48. 
59 See Kirby, supra note 27, at 473. 
60 Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321–22 (1975). 
61 See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 240 (explaining that official immunity at common law was based on “two mutually 
dependent rationales: (1) the injustice . . . of subjecting to liability an officer who is required, by . . . his position, to 
exercise discretion; (2) the danger that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness to execute his office with 
the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good”); Chen, supra note 56, at 15 (noting that qualified 
immunity jurisprudence in the Supreme Court “began with a focus on fairness and overdeterrence rationales”). 
62 Scheuer, 416. U.S. at 241–42. 
63 Id. at 242. 
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suffer.64  In essence, qualified immunity avoids “placing police officers between the proverbial 
rock and a hard place” when tension arises between the officer’s law enforcement responsibilities 
and his constitutional obligations.65   
But a mere seven years after deciding Wood v. Strickland, the Court significantly altered 
its qualified immunity jurisprudence when it wholly abandoned the two-part objective-subjective 
test in favor of a purely objective analysis:  Officials would be entitled to immunity so long as they 
did not violate clearly established constitutional or statutory rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known.66  The Court’s adjusted analysis seems to mirror a shift in its predominant 
policy concerns.67  The Court became less concerned with unfairness and overdeterring officials, 
and more concerned with the substantial social burdens at stake in unrestricted litigation of claims 
against government officials, such as financing the official’s defense, diverting official efforts 
from important public matters, and dissuading capable individuals from seeking public office.68  
The Court reasoned that inquiring into the official’s subjective state was incompatible69 with the 
effective balancing of important social costs and the individual’s right to sue an official for 
violations of his constitutional liberties, requiring the elimination of the subjective “good faith” 
prong of the qualified immunity test.70   
                                                 
64 See Wood, 420 U.S. at 319–20 (“The imposition of monetary costs for mistakes which were not unreasonable in the 
light of all the circumstances would undoubtedly deter even the most conscientious school decisionmaker from 
exercising his judgment independently, forcefully, and in a manner best serving the long term interest . . . .”). 
65 Chen, supra note 56, at 16. 
66 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
67 Chen, supra note 56, at 17–18 (“While fairness and overdeterrence still play a formal role in the Court’s immunity 
jurisprudence, their function as the driving force behind qualified immunity was severely diminished after Harlow.”). 
68 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814. 
69 See id. at 815–18 (explaining why a subjective intent can so rarely be decided on summary judgment and discussing 
the disruptive effects to government that broad-ranging discovery to uncover subjective states of mind can have). 
70 See id. at 814–15 (“[T]he dismissal of insubstantial lawsuits without trial—a factor presupposed in the balance of 
competing interests struck by our prior cases—requires an adjustment of the ‘good faith’ standard established by our 
decisions.”). 
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Though it has been tweaked somewhat along the way, Harlow v. Fitzgerald represents the 
modern test for qualified immunity.  The current standard for qualified immunity involves two 
different questions, both of which must be answered affirmatively in order for a plaintiff’s suit to 
proceed against an official:  (1) Did the defendant violate the plaintiff's constitutional right? (2) 
Was a constitutional right clearly established at the time of the violation?71  In its most recent 
formulation, these questions do not need to be answered sequentially,72 and the Court has left the 
order of inquiry to the discretion of the district courts.73 
 
IV. The Problems with Qualified Immunity 
The legal academic community has criticized the qualified immunity doctrine on a number 
of grounds since at least the 1980s.74  Despite these criticisms, in recent years—and particularly 
since the beginning of the Roberts era—the Court has made it ever-more difficult to impose 
liability on law enforcement officers alleged to have acted unconstitutionally.75  This extension of 
the doctrine has occurred gradually through decisions that might initially seem unrelated, but 
which have nevertheless resulted in one overarching thematic problem:  a lack of accountability. 
A. The Surprising Lack of Clarity of the “Clearly Established” Right 
One problem with qualified immunity results from the so-called two-pronged inquiry.  In 
2001, concerned that disposing of cases based solely on the “clearly established” prong would 
                                                 
71 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. 
72 The Court does, however, state that it is “often beneficial” to answer the two questions in the above specified order.  
Id. at 236. 
73 See id. at 236–43. 
74 See, e.g., Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 233 (2006) (condemning the 
“lack of transparency” in the Court’s manipulation of the qualified immunity doctrine and its disregard of the critical 
role that facts play in the qualified immunity analysis); Rudovsky, supra note 24, at 27 (criticizing the limitations on 
constitutional torts that the Court’s qualified immunity doctrine has imposed and the potential danger that qualified 
immunity will redefine substantive constitutional law). 
75 See Edwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors, 41 HUM. RTS. 5, 5 (2014). 
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“stunt the development” of constitutional law, the Court mandated that lower courts first decide 
whether there was a constitutional violation before determining whether the right was clearly 
established.76  The decision in Saucier v. Katz was, to say the least, unpopular,77 and in 2009, the 
Court unanimously overruled the decision and once again left the procedural sequence to the 
discretion of lower courts.78  But because courts are no longer required to address the two-part 
inquiry in any particular order, the practical effect has been precisely what the Court feared in its 
Saucier decision: frequent disposal of cases based on the perceived lack of a "clearly established" 
right without ever addressing the merits of the constitutional claim.79 
A recent survey of circuit court cases decided since Pearson v. Callahan in 2009 
demonstrates the frequency with which lower courts are disposing of cases based on a lack of a 
clearly established law.80  The study, which analyzed 844 published and unpublished Courts of 
Appeal opinions decided between 2009 and 2012, encompassing 1,460 total claims, found that 
qualified immunity was granted in 1,055 of the claims, or approximately 72 percent of the time.81  
In 534 (or nearly 51 percent) of the claims in which the court granted immunity, the court 
concluded that the right asserted was not clearly established.82  So in more than half of the claims 
in which immunity was granted, the basis for the court’s holding was the absence of clearly 
established law. 
                                                 
76 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 
77 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 234–35 (noting that lower court judges “have not been reticent in their criticism,” that 
application of the Saucier rule “has not always been enthusiastic,” and that even some members of the Court were 
critical). 
78 Id. at 236. 
79 James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional Tort Claims for Nominal Damages, 
111 COLUM. L. REV. 1601, 1602–03 (2011). 
80 See Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 30–32 (2015). 
81 Id. 
82 See id. at 31–32. 
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But perhaps somewhat ironically, the concept of a “clearly” established right is in and of 
itself less than clear, and a great deal of confusion exists over what rights fall within this vague 
classification.83  In essence, approximately 50 percent of the time, a court’s decision to grant 
immunity to an official is based on a muddled and uncertain legal precept.  In order to qualify as 
clearly established, “a right must be sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have 
understood that what he is doing violates that right."84  There are few unambiguous bright-line 
rules in modern constitutional jurisprudence, and most doctrines are instead articulated as 
relatively vague standards or balancing tests.85  In addition, because there are considerable 
distinctions in terms of the structure, aim, and available alternative remedies of various 
constitutional rights, the general-purpose nature of qualified immunity is problematic.86  Defining 
a clearly established law is straightforward when the right is laid out in a stable and fairly specific 
doctrine, but when the rule changes, the new law only becomes clearly established when a 
clarifying court decision is handed down.87  When such constitutional rights are violated, qualified 
immunity allows officials to avoid liability because of a failure to anticipate developments in the 
law.88  And although the Court held in 2002 that there need not be a case on point in order to find 
clearly established law,89 it has nevertheless continued to grant qualified immunity in the absence 
of similar precedent.90  Unsurprisingly, lower courts struggle with the question of whether a right 
                                                 
83 See Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of Constitutional Balancing Tests, 81 
IOWA L. REV. 261, 329 (1995). 
84 Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015). 
85 See Chen, supra note 56, at 50. 
86 See John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s Wrong With Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851, 859 (2010). 
87 See id. 
88 Id. 
89 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (explaining that “officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates 
established law even in novel factual circumstances”). 
90 See Chemerinsky, supra note 75, at 6. 
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is clearly established, and the circuits have developed markedly varying approaches to the 
inquiry.91   
  Finally, year after year, despite attempts to clarify the doctrine, it seems that the Supreme 
Court has only further added to the confusion of lower courts.  Indeed, almost without fail, 
Supreme Court cases since Pearson have apparently further expanded the qualified immunity 
doctrine by upholding its application in all manner of diverse situations—seemingly in every set 
of circumstances with which it has been presented.92 
B. An Overconfidence in Overdeterrence 
The judicial system’s somewhat naïve faith in the power of civil suits as a deterrent has 
inadvertently produced another problem in qualified immunity jurisprudence.93  This belief has 
generated concern in the Supreme Court about overdeterrence—the notion that fear of being sued 
“is so strong that it can ‘dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible 
[public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties.’”94  This trepidation about too much 
deterrence and its potentially chilling effect on government operations has played a powerful role 
in shaping Court decisions toward limiting civil remedies.95  Of course, lawsuits are intended to 
have this deterrent effect—indeed, are relied upon to have such effect as part of our system of 
                                                 
91 See Jeffries, supra note 86, at 852 (“[D]etermining whether an officer violated ‘clearly established’ law has proved 
to be a mare’s nest of complexity and confusion.”). 
92 See, e.g., Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2042 (2015); Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2088 (2012); 
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 731 (2011).   
93 See Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement 
Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1024–25 (2010) (explaining that the Court believes that being sued or even 
the threat of being sued is enough to make officials act within the laws). 
94 Id. at 1025 (quoting Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992)). 
95 See id. 
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accountability for government officials.  Unfortunately, reality suggests that the deterrent power 
of lawsuits is not quite as potent as the Supreme Court envisions.96 
The Court specifically fears that financial liability, in the form of paying compensatory 
damages to victims whose constitutional rights an officer has violated, will be a vehicle of 
overdeterrence.97  But the widespread practice of indemnification means that individual officers 
are almost never financially responsible for civil judgments against them, practically eliminating 
any fiscal motivation for avoiding harmful conduct.98  In fact, in many instances, even the police 
department that employs the officer suffers no direct financial consequences because police 
litigation costs and damages awards are often paid from a city or insurer’s general budget.99  The 
police department is not financially penalized, and thus has no incentive to discipline the officer 
or attempt to prevent him from repeating the unconstitutional behavior in the future.  And because 
law enforcement officials are often unaware of the allegations set forth in lawsuits filed against 
them or their employees, officers’ conduct often goes uninvestigated and undisciplined, and 
allegations of unconstitutional conduct do not affect performance reviews or opportunities for 
promotion.100  Finally, although many law enforcement officers claim that the threat of incurring 
liability deters them from misconduct, studies contrarily indicate that potential liability does not 
actually alter most officers’ on-the-job actions.101 
 
 
                                                 
96 See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 894 n. 41 (2014) (explaining that the Court 
has never given any empirical evidence to support its belief in the deterrent power of lawsuits). 
97 See id. at 893. 
98 See id. at 938–40. 
99 Id. at 957. 
100 See Schwartz, supra note 93, at 1076–77. 
101 Id. at 1077–78. 
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C. The Unintended Upshot of a Universally Applicable Standard 
Although many of the weaknesses of qualified immunity can, for the most part, be 
considered unintended consequences, one significant flaw was the Court’s deliberate decision to 
utilize a one-size-fits-all standard.  In early qualified immunity decisions, the Court acknowledged 
the possibility that the doctrine might apply differently depending on the type of official involved 
in a particular situation.102  But, as it so commonly does, the Court apparently altered its approach.  
For nearly four decades, the Court has applied the qualified immunity doctrine as a standard 
applicable to all officials who do not enjoy absolute immunity.103  Indeed, the Court has been 
explicit about its unwillingness “to complicate qualified immunity analysis by making the scope 
or extent of immunity turn on the precise nature of various officials’ duties.”104  In so doing, the 
Court has overextended the doctrine.  It is essentially providing too much protection for lower-
level officers because all officials not entitled to absolute immunity now enjoy immunity that the 
Court “ha[d] developed for a quite different group of high public office holders.”105  This is perhaps 
most problematic when a plaintiff alleges Fourth Amendment violations because qualified 
immunity doctrine provides officers with two layers of liability protection:  qualified immunity’s 
reasonableness standard on top of the reasonableness already embodied in Fourth Amendment 
substantive law.106 
                                                 
102 See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974) (“[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers 
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“could rely only on the qualified immunity described” in earlier cases); Chen, supra note 83, at 289. 
104 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643 (1987). 
105 Id. at 647 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
106 See Chen, supra note 83, at 296. 
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D. Annihilating Accountability 
Of course, the most outwardly evident and alarming problem with qualified immunity 
jurisprudence has been its cumulative erosion of law enforcement accountability.  Perhaps Erwin 
Chemerinsky summarized it best when he noted that “[i]n recent years, the court has made it very 
difficult, and often impossible, to hold police officers and the governments that employ them 
accountable for civil rights violations.”107  Many of the aforementioned procedural and substantive 
problems with the qualified immunity doctrine have contributed to what might be considered a 
deleterious byproduct.  But recent Court decisions have also demonstrated a willingness to extend 
immunity in even the most egregious circumstances.108 
For example, in Plumhoff v. Rickard, the Court held that three officers did not use excessive 
force and were entitled to qualified immunity when they had collectively fired fifteen shots at a 
fleeing car, causing the deaths of the driver and passenger.109  The incident ensued after one of the 
officers stopped the vehicle for having only one working headlight and, rather than exit the vehicle 
as the officer instructed, the driver instead sped away, prompting the officer and several others to 
give chase.110  Overturning both the district court and the court of appeals, the Supreme Court held 
that the use of deadly force was permissible because the driver “posed a grave public safety risk” 
and that firing fifteen times was not unreasonable because “the officers need not stop shooting 
                                                 
107 Erwin Chemerinsky, How the Supreme Court Protects Bad Cops, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/27/opinion/how-the-supreme-court-protects-bad-cops.html?_r=0. 
108 See, e.g., City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774–78 (2015); Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. 
Ct. 348, 349–50 (2014) (per curiam); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 374–86 (2007).  See also Susan Bendlin, Qualified 
Immunity: Protecting “All But the Plainly Incompetent” (and Maybe Some of Them, Too), 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
1023, 1023 (2012) (opining that “[p]ublic officials can be more certain than ever before that qualified immunity will 
shield them from suits for money damages even if their actions violate the constitutional rights of another”).  
109 Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2017–18, 2021–24 (2014). 
110 Id. at 2017. 
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until the threat is over.”111  Somewhat similarly, in Brosseau v. Haugen, the Court held that an 
officer was entitled to immunity when she shot an unarmed man in the back through the window 
of his Jeep—which was not moving—as a means of preventing his escape.112  The Court explained 
that the officer’s actions “fell in the ‘hazy border between excessive and acceptable force,’” but 
that previous Court decisions “by no means ‘clearly establish’ that Brosseau’s conduct violated 
the Fourth Amendment.”113 
 
V. The Problem of Police Use of Force 
The problems with both the conception and application of qualified immunity are surely 
many more than this Comment can begin to discuss.  But those mentioned in the previous section 
are of particular relevance to the recent questions surrounding police misconduct.  Indeed, the link 
between police violence and the vast confusion regarding “clearly established” rights, or of giving 
lower courts complete discretion to address the two-pronged test in whichever order they see fit, 
might not be obvious at first blush.  But it is not difficult to see how qualified immunity’s gradual 
deterioration of law enforcement’s accountability—effected, in part, by the aforesaid difficulties—
plays a role in the current predicament between the police and those they are tasked with policing. 
A. The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing Prescribes Trust and 
Legitimacy 
In response to the officer-perpetrated violence and the national reaction thereto, President 
Obama created the Task Force on 21st Century Policing in December 2014, to determine best 
practices for strengthening relationships between law enforcement and the public while also 
                                                 
111 Id. at 2021–22.  The Court also reasoned that the presence of a passenger in the front seat should play no part in its 
analysis.  Id. at 2022. 
112 Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 195–97 (2004) (per curiam). 
113 Id. at 201 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001)).  
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aiming to reduce crime.114  In its Final Report, the Task Force set forth myriad recommendations 
and action steps by which to implement such recommendations, all of which aim at a paramount 
umbrella objective:  fostering trust and legitimacy between the police and the communities they 
serve.115  The Final Report is comprehensive in that it covers six general topics and recommends 
collaboration not only among the various levels of government,116 but between individual law 
enforcement agencies and local schools,117 higher-learning institutions,118 other local 
jurisdictions,119 and individual and corporate members of the community.120  But the scope of the 
Task Force’s assignment was limited to police-community interactions, and it advocates for 
holistic evaluation of the criminal justice system in order to determine a plan for comprehensive 
criminal justice reform.121 
Establishing police accountability is a palpable recurring theme of the Final Report.  For 
example, the Task Force encourages law enforcement agencies to foster transparency and ensure 
accountability by making departmental policies freely available to citizens, regularly posting data 
about stops, summonses, arrests, crime, and the like on the department website, and promptly and 
candidly communicating with the community about serious incidents—including alleged officer 
misconduct.122  Additionally, the Task Force emphasizes the need for policy reform to control the 
use of police force and urges departments to mandate external, independent criminal investigations 
                                                 
114 See Press Release, Fact Sheet: Task Force on 21st Century Policing (Dec. 18, 2014), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/18/fact-sheet-task-force-21st-century-policing. 
115 See PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 
21ST CENTURY POLICING 1–4 (2015) [hereinafter TASK FORCE]. 
116 See id. at 7–8. 
117 See id. at 15, 41–43, 47–49, 50. 
118 See id. at 16, 55, 59, 95–96. 
119 See id. at 28–29, 90. 
120 See, e.g., id. at 19–20, 26, 35, 44–46. 
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122 See id. at 13. 
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for cases of officer-involved shootings, in-custody deaths, and fatal use of force in order to 
demonstrate transparency and rebuild trust.123  
B. The Police and the Policed: A Relationship in Need of Repair 
Unsurprisingly, police shootings in general tend to produce tension between the police and 
the policed,124 and the fact that most of the incidents propagated through various forms of media 
since 2014 have involved the deaths of unarmed citizens at the hands of police125 has only made 
matters worse.  Regardless of whether the number of police slayings has in fact increased, or 
whether the media is simply giving more attention to such occurrences, the general relationships 
between law enforcement agencies and communities nationwide are likely even further strained 
than in the case of more isolated, or seemingly more isolated, events.126  In addition, multiple 
declinations of grand juries to indict officers involved in high-profile slayings of unarmed citizens 
has further exacerbated the problem, inciting outrage, inspiring protests,127 and raising critical 
questions about the extent of police accountability.128 
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Unfortunately, while the FBI plans to improve its system for gathering information about 
the use of force by law enforcement by 2017, its data collection up to this point has been less-than-
stellar.129  And although the Washington Post undertook a year-long investigation in 2015 in order 
to accurately track the number of fatal shootings by on-duty police officers,130 the fallibility of 
previous federal data makes it impossible to ascertain how that total compares to prior years.  
Moreover, the Post’s report does not include other types of deaths at the hands of police, such as 
in-custody deaths131 or deaths resulting from Tasers.132  However, it is noteworthy that the Post’s 
figure of 986 lethal police shootings is more than double the FBI’s average annual tally for the 
preceding decade.133  So, if nothing else, this stark disparity reveals that such occurrences are 
substantially more prevalent than anyone was aware. 
Of course, the Post’s figures are subject to varying interpretations, each of which have 
some merit.  Some may consider the recent shootings to be an unfortunate but nonetheless routine 
consequence of enforcing the laws.  On the other hand, nationwide protests have demonstrated that 
others consider civilian deaths at the hands of police officers to be an insult to constitutional rights.  
And surely the opinions of many Americans lie somewhere on the spectrum in between.  While 
the statistical truth may forever remain a mystery, one thing is clear:  the need for change.134  The 
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American public has lost trust in its law enforcement, not only because of the perceived frequency 
of the use of lethal force, but because of subsequent investigations into such incidents, which many 
view as biased.135  The nation is calling for reform,136 and various government agencies,137 
branches of local government,138 and even the President139 have responded to the outcry.  But 
although the need for change has been duly acknowledged, the question of how to implement 
comprehensive reform on a national scale remains unresolved. 
 
VI. Amending Qualified Immunity Doctrine as a Catalyst for Curbing Police Violence 
Altering the qualified immunity doctrine is an excellent way to begin the path to restoring 
trust by establishing a much-needed sense of accountability.  Civil remedies are a good jumping 
off point because, as repeated failures to indict officers—even in the face of video footage—have 
demonstrated, accountability via the criminal law is a far-off possibility, if it is possible at all.  
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Prosecutors are generally disinclined to bring charges against law enforcement officers,140 and 
grand juries are equally as hesitant to indict them.141  Independent investigations, as suggested by 
the Task Force, are an excellent idea, but establishing a feasible system nationwide would take 
time.  On the other hand, Supreme Court amendment of the stringent immunity afforded to police 
officers could take effect relatively quickly. 
Of course, this is easier said than done.  The Court has increasingly enlarged the immunity 
afforded to police officers in its recent decisions, and any 180-degree turnaround would likely 
require a change in Court composition.  But the current Court can nevertheless begin to firm up 
qualified immunity doctrine by simply providing more guidance and clarification, thereby 
enhancing accountability and reaffirming trust between law enforcement and their respective 
communities. 
 The concept of a clearly established right is, in many ways, a problem that requires solving.  
A substantial number of cases are disposed of on the premise that a right was not “clearly 
established”—yet lower courts have struggled for years with what those words actually mean.  
Arguably, then, at least some officers are escaping liability simply because of the Court’s repeated 
failures to establish consistency in its qualified immunity jurisprudence.  But if the Court used 
qualified immunity opinions to demonstrate what qualifies as a clearly established right by 
meticulously outlining its reasoning in answering whether a set of facts implicates such a right, the 
Court could alleviate some confusion.  In other words, rather than taking cases simply to overturn 
the lower courts’ denial of immunity, it could take cases to affirm those denials or, alternatively, 
                                                 
140 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 124, at 85.  Reasons that prosecutors may opt not to pursue charges against 
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to reverse lower courts’ grant of immunity.  By so doing, the Court can give examples of what 
constitutes a right that is “sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood 
that what he is doing violates that right,”142 and can give lower courts somewhat of a guide to 
follow. 
 By elucidating the contours of the clearly established right, the Court would alleviate some 
of the confusion of lower courts and ensure that they are in fact applying that part of the test 
properly.  Proper application of this prong directly promotes accountability, as the public can rest 
assured that, at least in that regard, cases are not being disposed of based merely on perplexity and 
uncertainty.  Moreover, increased confidence about the clearly established prong could foster a 
willingness to take on the second part of the test and, in so doing, advance the development of 
constitutional law and clarify further constitutional rights. 
 The Court could also accept that its attempts at a general standard for all classes of officials 
that are not otherwise entitled to absolute immunity has been problematic and hugely unsuccessful.  
Though the Court apparently fears “complicating” qualified immunity, the doctrine is quite 
complicated as is, and adopting more particularized classes of officials with different standards of 
immunity would not only assist lower courts in properly analyzing immunity, but would promote 
justice in constitutional tort litigation.  For example, the Court could classify officials based on the 
approximate number of people with whom they come in contact, so to speak, and that might 
therefore bring civil suits against them.  A governor, for example, could theoretically face a lawsuit 
from any resident of the state, and would thus be afforded more stringent protection—much like 
the standard afforded to all officials now.  But law enforcement officers, who come in contact with 
only the residents of one town, city, or perhaps county, risk possible suits from a much smaller 
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pool of people.  The threat of litigation would therefore be much less crippling on governmental 
function, and immunity protection need not be so rigorous.  In the case of allegations of Fourth 
Amendment violations, in light of the already-existing reasonableness standard, immunity may be 
inappropriate altogether. 
 In addition, the Court could do its proverbial homework and take notice of the widespread 
indemnification of officers that often results in a complete absence of financial or employment-
related consequences for law enforcement.  If the Court stopped relying on its own intuition, and 
instead came to grip with the facts, it would likely realize that it has been overzealous in protecting 
low-level officers, and be inclined to alter course somewhat.   
 By beginning to mend the qualified immunity doctrine in these ways, the Court will allow 
more civil suits for the vindication of constitutional rights to succeed.  This will help to reduce the 
public mentality—strengthened by recent events—that cops get away with everything, in every 
regard.  Civil suits avoid subjecting law enforcement to any criminal liability that, because of 
recent events, many laypersons believe is warranted.  While this may be true in select 
circumstances, reality demonstrates that criminal charges are highly unlikely to stick against a 
police officer.  But allowing more civil suits to go forward will serve as an important reminder to 
both civilians and law enforcement that the police are not above the law, and that they are held 
accountable for their wrongdoings.  In turn, this accountability will begin to heal the relationship 
between law enforcement and communities by serving as the first step on what will surely be a 
long path to rebuilding the trust that is so crucial. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
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 By adopting different immunity standards for high-level and low-level officials, clarifying 
the vagueness surrounding the definition of a “clearly established” right, and acknowledging the 
real-world effects of indemnification, the Court can begin to repair some of the substantial flaws 
in its qualified immunity jurisprudence.  As it does, it will permit more constitutional tort suits to 
succeed, thereby fostering law enforcement accountability.  Because criminal liability is nearly 
impossible as a practical matter, and because strategies like improving police training and 
recruiting tactics will likely take years to effectively implement, civil suits are the (relatively) 
fastest way to demonstrate to the country that our officers are our guardians and that they are 
accountable to us.  It is thus the most immediate way to rebuild trust and begin healing the citizen-
police relationship. 
